

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Visit of Ambassador Hartman, 17 April 1985

FROM: A/NIO/USSR
7E62 - HQS.

EXTENSION

NO. NIC #02036-85

DATE 17 April 1985

25X1

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

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OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom. Draw a line across column after each comment)

1.

SA/DCI

17 APR 1985
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Ans Hartman's
comments with
NIO/USSR et al
on 17 April.



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~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #02036-85
17 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: [REDACTED]
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for USSR

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SUBJECT: Visit of Ambassador Hartman, 17 April 1985

1. Ambassador Hartman, in discussions this morning with NIO/USSR and analysts, characterized Gorbachev as having minimal authority at the moment and carefully watching his flanks. Hartman believes Gorbachev is currently more a "front man" than in control himself, and highly effective in conveying a sense of new movement while not doing much substantively. His style in discussions with Westerners -- the recent O'Neill CODEL to Moscow, for example -- is enticing and well suited to Soviet objectives.

2. We will see more clearly in the next several months just how much authority Gorbachev exercises as we observe the April 22 Lenin Day speech (both presenter and substance), the forthcoming Plenum, a possible Warsaw Pact summit in late April, a possible speech by Gorbachev in early May commemorating V-E Day, and a Supreme Soviet session. Hartman is surely right in saying Gorbachev is currently focussing on personnel appointments. He may be too laid back, however, in not anticipating Soviet foreign policy initiatives, particularly as concerns China and the Third World.

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4. Another matter that Hartman expressed interest in today was Agency analyses of oil and gas issues (done by OGI and SOVA) that bear upon the Baldrige trade mission to the USSR next month. Hartman expressed the suspicion -- he has not yet seen the papers -- that these analyses partially undermine the Defense Department position against US exports of oil and gas equipment which may be the principal item on the Soviet agenda in the Baldrige meetings.

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Attachment: As stated

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